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Abstract (100-150 words): 
 
The article tells us the story of a bungled attempt at recruitment of a 
prominent member of the British establishment by the Hungarian Foreign 
Intelligence Service in the 60s. Its research was based on files found in the 
Historical Archives of Hungarian State Security. As the reports might have been 
“edited”, fabricated and tailored for the superiors, the author went to great 
lengths to study all of the volumes of files dealing with the case, and, using 
judicious vetting, composed a very credible story of this intelligence operation. 
The case study successfully lifts the veil of secrecy over sources and methods of 
the then Hungarian intelligence service and even manages to name a well-
known Hungarian person as an agent and talent-spotter. As it turns out. the 
target proved to be far more skillful and resourceful than his would-be recruiters 
and took full advantage of their eagerness for his own material benefit without 
delivering any intelligence of value. The author suspects that the Hungarians’ 
target was a plant of MI5, which frequently used double agent operations against 
the Eastern services. In closing, the author, however, finds it strange that the 
well-known target never mentioned or hinted at the incident in any of his 
writing, though he could have been quite proud of his feat of making a fool of a 
hostile intelligence service.  
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Introduction 
 
Between its establishment in 1950 and its complete compromise in 1965, the London 
"residentura"1 was the most important foreign base of the Hungarian intelligence services. For 
fifteen years its officers spared no expense of effort to recruit informants among the English 
political elite and in the Hungarian émigré community. While they could chalk up some 
successes in the latter, they met with practically total failure in "high society." The reasons for 
this failure lie partly in the incompetence of the intelligence officers and partly in the 
efficiency of British counterintelligence. 
Among the individuals analysed in the course of intelligence operations directed against 
Great Britain, Martin Gilbert was by far the most important. This is shown by the fact that the 
Historical Archives of the State Security Services (Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti 
Levéltára - ÁBTL) in Budapest holds five volumes of documentation on Hungarian State 
Security's contacts with Gilbert, to a total of 701 pages. This makes Gilbert the best-
documented English personality: the material on most candidates for recruitment fills just one 
volume (150 to 250 pages); two volumes are rare, and there is only one person with three 
volumes. 
The Gilbert case deserves analysis for several reasons, and his status as a public figure 
today is not the most important by far. As Gilbert was already considered a great catch in 
1960, all resources were mobilized to study him and win him over. Therefore we can discover 
the methods of Hungarian State Security through the Gilbert files. Additionally, we can learn 
what interested the Hungarians in this period, and what they expected from their intelligence 
operation in England. Yet another dimension of the story is the fact that the discovery of the 
"Cambridge Five" network coincided with Gilbert's recruitment. Unfortunately, British 
counterintelligence materials are not open to researchers.2 But we can surmise that the British 
did not sit idly by: more than likely they initiated dangle operations on numerous occasions. 
For the time being only the Hungarian documentation of Gilbert's story is open to researchers, 
but this is sufficient to draw conclusions on the activities of the opposing services.  
                                           
1 "Residentura" is originally a Russian term for a clandestine intelligence station - often under diplomatic or 
commercial cover - deployed in a target country. The term was also adopted by the member states of the 
Warsaw Pact. László Szabó, Second Secretary at the Hungarian Embassy and the resident's deputy defected 
to the Americans in 1965, and "burned" the entire resident's office. After this there was no serious attempt to 
upgrade Hungarian intelligence operations in London until 1990. 
2 Christopher Andrew: The Defence of the Realm. The Authorized History of MI5 (Allen Lane Penguin Books 
2009) can be considered the only "official" work. 
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The Sources and their Reliability 
Since the operational documents of our subject can be studied only in the Historical 
Archives of the State Security Services, we must also address the evaluation of this set of 
sources. In the course of intelligence operations directed against Great Britain, the Hungarian 
services identified and seriously analysed at least 150 English individuals as potential recruits. 
Unlike Gilbert, most of these had some Hungarian relatives, or were themselves Hungarian 
émigrés. In response to search terms referring to "England" the search engine of the ÁTBL 
identifies 142 files on recruitment attempts (successful recruitments are not included). 
However, the keywording is incomplete, and 30 percent of the files were destroyed at the time 
of regime change, while 10 percent are still in the possession of the successor services and 
therefore not open to researchers.3 Of the materials on the agents recruited and exploited in 
England, four folders on recruitments and eleven on exploitation were deposited. 
Additionally, the overwhelming majority of the materials generated by the London 
residentura between 1950 and 1965 - a total of 11 folders and several thousand pages4 -  were 
also deposited in the archives. From these almost the complete range of the residentura's 
activities and nearly all the agents can be identified.  
The question of how authentic the documents of the state security archives are must be 
addressed. Since they have not been manipulated since the regime change, they are certainly 
genuine. Consequently, their contents reflect the understanding of Hungarian intelligence 
officers of the period. In many respects their perspective and interpretation requires a critical 
approach - but this is true for other sources as well. But we can be certain that at the time the 
documents on the Gilbert case were created they did not contain any falsification on the part 
of the state security officers. Since they were created for internal use only, and several 
individuals - up to department chiefs - were involved in verifying them, we can exclude the 
possibility that anyone would risk a slanted presentation of the facts. This does not necessarily 
mean that the information the intelligence officers received from Gilbert reflected reality (I 
address this in some cases). But it is certain that what is in the files did take place and did get 
said - as it is verified by the surveillance initiated on Gilbert, the inspection of his mail and the 
wiretap of his conversations. My essay undertakes to show only the "Hungarian version" of 
the Gilbert story. There are two reasons for this. First, the way Gilbert presented himself and 
                                           
3 The author obtained this information while serving as a member of the committee investigating the fate of state 
security documents in 2008.  
4 OL-003-8/I-XI. The author's essay on Hungarian intelligence operations in England is under consideration for 
publication in Hungary.  
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the actions of the Hungarian officers are interesting in themselves. Second, the British 
intelligence documents related to the case are not yet available to researchers. 
A Personal Remark 
The reader may well ask what Gilbert himself thinks of about all this. For several 
reasons I did not consider it important to ask him. First of all, because the basic question is 
whether it was under orders from the British intelligence services that Gilbert came into 
contact with Hungarian intelligence - and Gilbert could answer this question truthfully only if 
this was not so, otherwise he would be bound by his oath of secrecy. The operatives of MI6 or 
MI5 are not in the habit of publicly disclosing their affiliation when asked. And also because 
whatever transpired, Gilbert made a fool of a Communist state security service, so he cannot 
be accused of being a traitor. From this aspect the story can only reflect positively on him.  
I must also add that the authors of political biographies do not always consider it 
necessary to ask their subject for his opinion of what is published about them. A historian 
must be much more aware than the general public that for various reasons his actions may be 
examined. These are major considerations when the person in question is active both socially 
and politically. We feel that these preliminary remarks were necessary, since the subject of 
our research is the connection between the British historian Sir Martin Gilbert and Hungarian 
State Security.  
"One of the modern world's leading historians" – claims Sir Martin Gilbert on his own 
homepage, and this statement is completely true.5 He is the official biographer of Winston 
Churchill, and a specialist on the Holocaust and on the history of the Jewish people and Israel. 
He is also the author of more than eighty books that have received international acclaim both 
among historians and from the general public. Sir Martin entered the political scene in 2009, 
when he answered then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s request to become a member of the 
Chilcot Committee, charged with investigating the background of Great Britain’s involvement 
in the 2003 Gulf War. At the same time he became a member of the Privy Council as well. 
These circumstances further emphasize why the state security case study is of interest today. . 
 
 
The target person 
 
                                           
5 Sir Martin Gilbert’s homepage can be found under  http://www.martingilbert.com/   
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The Gilbert case started in 1958. Gilbert was a student at Oxford University, and during a 
conversation he spoke with one of his fellow students, Ashok Nehru, about his plans to visit 
India. Nehru made him promise that Gilbert would visit his mother in Delhi.6 Ashok Nehru’s 
mother had been born into a wealthy Jewish bourgeois family in Budapest in 1908 as Magda 
Friedmann. She was studying in England when she met Braj Kumar Nehru. Nehru, who was 
studying law and intended to pursue a political career, came from India’s most influential 
family, which gave such politicians to India as Kumar’s cousin, Jawaharlal Nehru, leader of 
the independence movement and later India’s first prime minister, and his successor (and 
daughter), Indira Gandhi. Nehru and Friedmann were married in 1935, and moved to India. 
Probably due to her husband’s political career and his connections, she was employed under 
the code name "Nimród" by Hungarian intelligence as a "social contact" after 1953. 
According to a memo dated 1961 "she gave no valuable information."7 It was not her, but her 
guest Ödön Kallós who drew the attention of the services to this  gifted young man .  
According to Gilbert, Friedmann (whom he would later call "Auntie Fori" or "my 
Indian aunt") did not disclose her Jewish origins to him for fifty years, even though he was 
also a Jew and in the meantime he became a world-famous researcher of Jewish history. 
Supposedly this belated discovery motivated him to publish his correspondence on Jewish 
history in a separate volume.8 This is all rather odd, not only because Friedmann’s last name 
could not have left much doubt about her origins, and in Gilbert’s case the reports by State 
Security emphasized his "Semitic characteristics" Additionally - as will be discussed later - on 
one occasion Gilbert visited Friedmann’s family in Budapest.  
Gilbert was spotted as a potential agent by Ödön Kallós,9 who worked undercover in 
various capitalist countries and reported under the code name "Barabás." In his report dated 9 
September 1958 he wrote: "Although he came to know Ashok Nehru at Oxford, Gilbert has 
sharply criticized all three Nehru brothers for studying in Britain and in the US instead of at 
famous Indian universities. His general way of thinking and his behavior are characterized by 
being contrary to everything conventional. (…) His young age may make him especially 
interesting for us, because it is likely that the English Intelligence Service did not pay serious 
                                           
6 Martin Gilbert, Letters to Auntie Fori. 5000 Years of Jewish History. (Phoenix & London, 2003), XVI.    
7 Ibid. XV.-XVI. ÁBTL K-184/IV., p. 165. Otherwise Magda Friedmann is not mentioned in the State Security 
Services’ Archives, her file is presumed to be lost.  
8 Letters to Auntie Fori, XV. 
9Ödön Kallós (1917–1986), economist, graduated in Great Britain. Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce 
between 1959 and 1981, then (until his death) Associate Chairman.  The circumstances of his recruitment and 
the details of his service as an agent have not yet been analyzed. 
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attention to him due to a lack of time. I request permission to start a general philosophical 
correspondence with him, in order to establish a contact.”10 
"Barabás’s" idea was approved; correspondence was started and became increasingly 
friendly. State Security had no serious networks of non-Hungarian agents in England in this 
period, so it had high hopes. Captain Péter Szikla11 approved Gilbert’s (codename "Pandit") 
development plan on 5 February 1960. According to the plan either (a) after a year's pause 
"Barabás" would contact Gilbert again and would suggest a meeting during the Leipzig Fair, 
or (b) an operation officer would be introduced into his circles. It shows the thoroughness of 
State Security that that a whole year was allowed for the process. 
 "László Nagy,"12 an operative serving in the London residentura, reported on 3 November 
1960 that on 25 October 1960 he made contact with Gilbert (renamed "Pártos," which roughly 
translates as "Biased" or "Partisan"). He also reported that their next meeting would be on 12 
November 1960 in the "Simpson" restaurant, where Nagy would also receive the reply to 
"Barabás." The Hungarian intelligence officers considered the likelihood of British 
intelligence controlling Pártos, but they never thought of him as a double agent. If he were 
proven to be controlled, they planned to cancel the recruitment process and exploit him solely 
as a "social contact." This clearly shows the fine distinction between the two categories. 
"Social contact" is a formally legal and completely unregulated activity that is theoretically 
not prohibited in any country. On the other hand, recruitment was an unambiguous 
employment relationship between State Security and the agent. The intelligence branch 
obtained most of its information using this "dark" method (as it was dubbed in Service jargon) 
where the informant formally did not know who the recipient of the information was. Nagy 
and "Pártos" finally met on the 11th, one day ahead of schedule, since Gilbert had requested 
to move the appointment up one day. After the meeting Nagy recommended further 
"analysis." 
The next meeting took place on 15 February 1961. According to Nagy's report: "I told 
Pártos that I was there primarily not to talk about the letter, but to ask some questions. He 
accepted my approach in a friendly manner, and we talked for more than two hours. (…) 
During the conversation he suggested a personal visit to Hungary during the summer, not for 
                                           
10 ÁBTL K-184/I., Report, 9 September 1958., p. 19. 
11 From 1955 Peter Szikla (later Peter Szolnok) (1928- ?) was the residentura's senior officer as well as first 
secretary of the embassy. In April 1958 he was expelled from Great Britain as a result of a successful 
dangling operation by British intelligence. After this he served in state scurity's central offices, and in 1965 he 
became Consul in Rio de Janeiro.  
12 His real identity could not be established. 
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a vacation, but in order to obtain first-hand political experience. He has already visited 
Poland and Bulgaria this way. After his return he would talk about his positive experiences at 
various venues. He said he could cover his travel expenses, but may require some help with 
accommodation expenses. He suggested that he could ask "Barabás" to put him up if he 
would be in Budapest at the time. I declined to give him a straight answer but promised to 
contact "Barabás" on this issue."13 
During the conversation Gilbert claimed to be an organizer of the CND (Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament) protests. This gave further value to Gilbert’s person for State Security, 
since CND and the leader of an affiliated movement (Direct Action), Professor Bertrand 
Russell, could be exploited to destabilize Britain’s internal political situation. CND and DA 
were movements with the greatest mass support at that time: they had a combined 
membership of 500,000 compared to the British communist party’s 30,000. 
Captain Sándor Suszta14 prepared a new development plan on 10 May 1961, in which an 
invitation to Hungary was decided upon. 
On 31 May Nagy again met "Pártos," whose behavior clearly indicated that he was 
offering his services. On 5 June 1961 Sándor Suszta made a special recommendation to invite 
"Pártos," and nominated Major Peter Szikla to serve as case officer. On 12 July Nagy gave 
"Pártos" a letter of invitation from "Barabás". The detailed, day-by-day schedule of the visit 
was ready on 11 August. Lieutenant Colonel Béla Szőke attached the following remark: "This 
plan is essentially the "minimal program." (...) As it is being executed, our experiences have 
to be analyzed at least daily, and the method of execution of pre-determined tasks, their 
modification or acceleration must be decided accordingly."15 One can understand Szőke's 
enthusiasm: it seemed that Gilbert had, or was likely to acquire, serious contacts at the highest 
levels of British politics. In this State Security was not mistaken. 
 
Visit to Budapest 
 
Gilbert gladly accepted Barabás's invitation. His arrival, according to Suszta's report, 
happened as follows: "In accordance with our invitation, Pártos arrived in Budapest at 19.30 
on 9 September 1961. Major Péter Szikla and the wife of covert agent Barabás (cover name) 
went to receive him, but they missed him at the station, so they met him only in Barabás's 
                                           
13 ÁBTL Vol K-184/I., pp. 67-68. 
14 Sándor Suszta (1930. január 1- ?) served in the intelligence center's England department at the time.  
15 ÁBTL Vol K-184/1,  p. 117. 
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apartment. "Mrs. Barabás" introduced Comrade Major Szikla to "Pártos" as a friend and 
colleague of her husband, and asked him to show "Pártos" around Budapest, while her 
husband was away. She also informed "Pártos," that her husband had to go abroad 
unexpectedly, and would return only on the 13th or 14th. 
"Pártos" - according to general custom - inquired about Comrade Major Szikla's 
background. Comrade Szikla told him, that he was also working for the Chamber of 
Commerce, at the Market Research Department, and dealing mainly with English-speaking 
countries. Here "Pártos" interrupted him with the remark, that 'then our discussions will be 
useful to you, because I know a lot of things that you may find valuable.' 
They talked for about an hour in the "Barabás" apartment. Meanwhile, an unexpected 
guest arrived, so Comrade Major Szikla recommended that they go to dinner, then "Pártos" 
should check into his hotel. "Pártos" was a little surprised at this - he may have expected to 
stay in the "Barabás" apartment - but went willingly."16 
Szikla's report of 14 September details subsequent events: "I informed him that based on 
"Barabás's" permission, I was relieved of my duties at work, and could escort him all day 
during the following week. (...) I took "Pártos" to Fishermen's Bastion to introduce him to 
Budapest at night. Then we went to a restaurant on Hármashatár Mountain for dinner. He 
was impressed by the outings, and appreciated both. As a result of good food and drink his 
mood became quite relaxed, and we had a long conversation. (...) On his part, he said he 
hated the government currently ruling England, all of its institutions and all of its 
representatives. He claimed political motivation, which was rooted in personal grievances. 
He said that his years of military service in particular turned him against the system, because 
there he experienced the reactionary, demeaning and class-based policies that are the 
primary characteristics of that imperialistic country that is condemned to die. In his opinion, 
the rulers of England today are the representatives of political gangsterism, who, relying on 
the power of capital, are attempting to push aside all honest people, promote only their own 
class interests, and will sooner or later bring disaster on the country (...) 
Getting acquainted went smoothly. In my judgment there will be no obstacles to further 
smooth contact and work.17 
Péter Szikla devoted considerable effort to discover "Pártos's" political motives. 
According to Gilbert's response "He got his political views from his father, who had been a 
                                           
16 ÁBTL Vol. K-184/II., Report 11 September 1961. p. 19. 
17 ÁBTL K-184/II., Report 14 September 1961.pp. 22, 27. 
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miner in Wales. (...) As a result of his indoctrination by his father, he also considers himself a 
Communist - said Pártos - although due to conditions in England, he has never said so 
publicly, and for tactical reasons he has denied it on occasion. But in fact he considers 
himself a Marxist-Leninist, accepts the theory of the class struggle, the necessity of the revolt 
of the proletariat (for example he does not agree with the notion that socialism can be 
instituted in a country without armed struggle, etc.) In his opinion it is not necessary to wait 
for such pre-conditions of the socialist revolution as the trust of the majority of the 
population, or the maturity of the political situation for an insurrection, since these never 
existed anywhere, and never will. It is enough for a smaller group of politically well prepared 
and militarily trained people to initiate a movement, or take in hand a revolt already in 
progress, become its leaders, and lead the masses to obtain the achievements of the 
proletarian revolution. To prove his point, he mentioned that he had prepared a plan for 
seizing London in the course of an insurrection. He had prepared the plan on the basis of the 
principles he had read in the works of Lenin. 
(...) his other significant activity concerns West Germany. In the course of the last three 
years he considered it one of his most important tasks to fight against reviving fascism. He 
selected this field of activity partly due to personal reasons (he did not go into details about 
these), but for the most part out of political consideration. The conclusion he had drawn from 
his study of history also motivated this activity. From these it became obvious to him that both 
in the past and at present the foundation of Anglo-German cooperation has been opposition 
to the Soviet Union (...) He has collected data and documentation that proves that in Hitler's 
rise to power, in Germany's preparation for war, in the attack on the Soviet Union, the 
reactionary English government played a decisive role, and bears a heavy responsibility for 
World War II. (...) He prepared three revealing books from the material, which he considers 
extraordinarily valuable.  He already has publishers for the books. 18 The three subjects: 
1. Plans for a joint Anglo-German empire 
2. Behind-the-scene secrets of Munich 
3. Why did Hitler turn on England 
He mentioned in passing that he would like to lecture Hungarian experts interested in 
these subjects. (...) However, he requests that only trustworthy comrades should attend, since 
some of the materials he intends to use are confidential documents of the Foreign Office, and 
their disclosure to unauthorized persons is forbidden.  
                                           
18 There is no evidence at all that the volumes were ever finished and published. 
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The other area of his activities is uncovering fascists who are still holding government 
positions.  
 (…) I mentioned the assassination attempt against De Gaulle. He was very sorry that it 
failed.”19  
Gilbert did not tell the truth to Szikla when he claimed that his father was a miner, since in 
reality he was a jeweller.20 His depiction of the internal situation in Britain was also a 
tendentious exaggeration, since those with left-wing convictions were not persecuted at all. 
He told his host that he was provided with an annual scholarship of 534 pounds and a two-
room flat, plus he earned a further 200 pounds from conducting examinations, and his total 
annual income was about 1,400 pounds. He was dissembling again, because in 1962, when he 
was 26, he bought his first car,21 which was a great luxury at the time. He did not mention 
buying a car to the intelligence agents, moreover he said that he was learning to drive because 
with a driver’s license he was more likely to be picked up as a hitch-hiker.22 He spent two 
years and three months in military service. He received infantry basic training at the Wiltshire 
Infantry Regiment, but, due to his knowledge of languages, he was later assigned to the 
Intelligence Corps. He was later removed from there due to his political views, and finally he 
spent three months in a penal unit due to his subversive activities in a Cyprus military base – 
at least this is what he claimed to Hungarian intelligence. However, in his official biography 
he states that when serving in military intelligence "the Soviet Union was my area of study."23 
He offers no further details on what his activities were exactly, but it is certain that in this 
respect he did not tell the truth to Hungarian intelligence. 
He related to his Hungarian recruiter that one of his best friends and confidantes was 
working for the Intelligence Branch of the Treasury. Szikla responded to this proffer as 
follows: 
"I thanked him for his kindness, but added that I would not want to burden him unduly, 
not to mention that he might get into difficulties. He insisted that that would not happen - not 
because these were not classified materials, but because he could solve the problem skilfully, 
his friend was completely trustworthy, and there is no mail censorship in England, which 
                                           
19 ÁBTL K-184/II, pp. 28-37., Report, 12 September 1961.  
20 See Gilbert's autobiography. Martin Gilbert: In Search of Churchill. A Historian’s Journey. p. 4. 
21 In Search, p. 17.  
22 ÁBTL K-184/IV., p. 146. Report to A., 1 May 1962. 
23 www.martingilbert.com  
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would cause problems. (…) In my judgment "Pártos's" proffer was genuine, and seemed a 
natural continuation of his behavior and of previous conversations.  
His requests: 
 (…) In the "Filatelia" store I helped him buy a special stamp series, which he intended to 
use as a special mark of attention on letters to his friends. (…) I took him to an antiquarian, 
because he has interests in that direction. (...) In my judgment he would be happy to accept 
such a gift, for example if we were to offer to buy for him the books he selected. (...) He 
intensely inquired about the promised musical program. He said he would very much like to 
see this week's performance of "Traviata" at the Opera House. He asked where and how he 
could cash in travellers checks. I told him that he could do that at the hotel. From the way he 
asked, I assume that he was running out of the pocket money I had given him, and he was 
hinting at a further allowance. 
His political education 
I combined the visit to the Kilian Barracks, the Kisfaludy alley and the József Attila 
housing estate with the task of his political education. I explained the conditions of the 
counter-revolution, the case of Imre Nagy. Later I spoke to him about my own life, about 
poverty prior to the liberation, and about the events following it. He had no objections, and I 
believe I managed to influence him significantly, reinforce him politically, and clear up any 
doubts he may have had in connection with the counter-revolution (he expressed no such 
doubts to me).24 
Next day - with a special ministry permit - Szikla took his charge to Dunaújváros (New 
Town on the Danube), which at that time was still called Sztálinváros (Stalin Town). "In the 
plant we set up an impromptu meeting with one of the foundry workers. "Pártos" asked him 
what his salary was. The individual replied that it was 3,500 forints, if he was not performing 
well, then to "Pártos's" next question replied, that he was paying 50 forints as monthly rent. 
"Pártos" could hardly believe it, and declared that there was no point in any further 
questions, these two items of data were most informative. He was deeply impressed by the 
new machinery in the rolling plant, but he became most enthusiastic when we visited the 
town's residential area. He declared that he had never seen anything so beautiful, and was 
particularly moved that such a paradise was constructed for workers of an iron foundry (he 
also saw the cultural and sports facilities). He summed up his opinion by saying, that if he 
"could take the inhabitants of the rental slums of Central England's industrial areas to 
                                           
24 ÁBTL, K-184/II, pp. 46–47. 
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Hungary and showed them Sztálinváros, next day a revolution would break out in England." 
On the way home he declared that Sztálinváros made the most lasting impression on him, and 
he was serious when he was saying, that he would be willing to settle there for the rest of his 
life."25 
Conditions in Sztálinváros were distressing even for the Hungary of the period, and it is 
unclear how Gilbert could view them at such variance with reality. Especially since he was 
generally not sparing with critical remarks. Perhaps he was talking not about what he was 
seeing, but what he wanted others to see in him? 
 Peter Szikla sensed a change in the events of 14 September: 
"He said that at the IBUSZ they were not sufficiently polite to him, and he also identified 
some administrative errors. He talked to the office manager, and "instructed" him about 
these. (This is the second occasion, on which he "instructed." On the previous day he 
"instructed" the manager of the Astoria Hotel on the subject of the lack of toilet paper and the 
"laziness" of the waiter. It seems that his critical nature is getting the better of him even in 
connection with his visit. He has also made some unwarranted and impertinent remarks and 
demands directed at me and at our itineraries.) 
(…) 
Remark: From my inquiries and remarks it must be clear that I am more interested in 
questions of intelligence than the average person. In my opinion, "Pártos" senses this, but 
does not remark on it.”26 
On the 15th they visited the Ferihegy Airport, Szolnok and the "Dózsa's People" 
agricultural cooperative in Cegléd.  
 
The question of recruitment 
On 16 September Suszta summarized the events so far in a 5-page report. "In the last days 
- seeing a few small errors - he was critical and demanding. (...) unclear questions do not yet 
allow his actual recruitment."27 Based on these, he requested an extension of "Pártos's" stay 
from 10 to 14 days. On the 16th they were at the Workers' Movement Institute, lunch at the 
Berlin Restaurant, in the evening they watched "Hunyadi László" in the Erkel Theater, and 
then dined in the Matthias Cellar. They again discussed Gilbert’s time spent with military 
intelligence (MI6). He was inducted in the fall of 1955, he was even sent to officer training 
                                           
25 ÁBTL K-184/II, pp. 60-61.Report, 14 September 1961. Department II/3-A  
26 ÁBTL K-184/II, Report, 19 September, p. 74. 
27  ÁBTL K184/II, pp. 100-102. 
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for two days, but after a background investigation he was reassigned to Cyprus, then later to 
England and West Berlin. Soviet radio-transmissions were monitored here, but he was only 
assigned to kitchen duties (see his biography, where this is presented differently). 
Gilbert had a peculiar attitude towards money. He considered it natural that his hosts 
would satisfy his various whims. According to Szikla's report, "Pártos" stated that he had 
changed his mind, instead of a carpet, he would buy a painting. Accordingly, we went to the 
gallery he had already picked on Bajcsy-Zsilinszki Street. After a lengthy selection process, he 
settled on two modern paintings and two copper etchings. Their price was about 2,000 
forints. 
He asked me, how much I could help him with. In accordance with my instructions, I 
answered that I could not help him at all. I was a poorly paid bureaucrat, I had no savings, 
and due to expenses in connection with my divorce, I could not even ask for a loan. "Pártos" 
calculated, that with the travellers checks he had on him, he could muster about 1,500 forints. 
He asked me whether I could get him the necessary 600 forints. I answered that unfortunately 
I could not. "Pártos" really liked the pictures he had selected and wanted to get them at any 
cost, therefore he became demanding. He declared that he could not imagine that I had no 
way of getting 600 forints. There must be someone at the Chamber of Commerce, or at the 
organization where I helped out, who would lend this insignificant sum. He wanted only a 
loan, which he would repay any time in pounds. He bitterly added that he assured us of 
assistance in far greater matters, and now I was refusing him." [underlined in ink] He 
suggested that he would approach "Barabás" for a loan. I dissuaded him, saying that it would 
be an immodest request, since "Barabás" had already spent several thousand forints on his 
visit. Then he suggested that he would go to the English embassy and request a loan there, if I 
would not accommodate him. Finally, we agreed that I would check on his request once more, 
and give him an answer the next morning."28 
Next day they bought the pictures and had lunch in the "100 Years" restaurant, then 
visited the Modern History Department of the Eötvös Lóránt University of Sciences and the 
National Gallery. The gradual recruitment process continued. The only request was to have 
one more look at one pamphlet against the capitalist states as it was being prepared. To this 
end they wanted to organize a meeting in Paris in December. The expenses of the trip would 
"naturally" be reimbursed by Suszta to "Pártos," who accepted this without any particular 
objection. He particularly liked the idea of a meeting in Paris.  
                                           
28 ÁBTL Vol. K-184/II. Report dated 25 September, 1961., 126.o. 
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The report dated 25th detailed the program of the 21st as follows: "The sole purpose of the 
encounter was to follow up the previous days' preparatory work and discuss the concrete 
questions in which we would exploit "Pártos's" cooperation. (...) "Pártos" obviously mulled 
over what I had to say, and responded only after some time. He said that politically he fully 
understands the importance of the questions he had raised, and also that he could provide 
important and necessary assistance. Since our last such conversation he had thought a lot 
about my proposal, and had decided that he must be of assistance, and he will be of 
assistance. (...) Having discussed the above questions, it was "Pártos" who raised a question, 
which he introduced by saying, that I should answer only if it was permissible. He wanted to 
know what the organization was in whose name I addressed my questions to him, how 
serious, how well founded the organization was, whether the work he would do would be 
useful, or just a waste of time and effort. I told him that I could not give him a detailed and 
precise answer, but I considered it natural to give him an outline of our organization. I told 
him that we were a partly social and only partly official association, whose basic political 
goal was to suppress fascism, which was reviving in West Germany, and to uncover and 
punish the Nazi war criminals who were still occupying official positions. To his repeated 
question I responded that the organization had several hundred actively participating 
members, who were occupied in specialized areas of the above activities. I myself was active 
in the area of obtaining information, since this was made possible by my legal occupation 
(Chamber of Commerce). (…) He asked if our organization had separate offices, and records, 
where serious work is carried out. I told him that I had already answered this in the 
affirmative. Finally he asked under what cover organization is the semi-legal organization 
operating. I responded that we are working as an organization associated with the League of 
Hungarian Partisans."29 
After this, Szikla instructed him in basic tradecraft (avoiding wiretaps, self-checks, 
tailing).  
After weighing all circumstances, the recommendation was made on 21 September that he 
should not be recruited, but exploited as a confidential social contact. His recruitment might 
be attempted later. For the time being, he was to be tasked - in the form of a request - with 
obtaining the secret Anglo-German agreements, as well as discovering diplomatic actions 
directed against the socialist countries, and furthermore he was asked to provide information 
on English political leaders who had been in favor of closer Anglo-German relations prior to 
                                           
29 ÁBTL K-184/II, Report, 25 September 1961., pp. 148-150. 
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the war. Additionally, the preparation of a pamphlet exposing West German diplomats was 
also planned, and he was tasked with collecting documentation on compromised West 
German persons.30 In the task-plan Szikla supplemented these with questions on the Treasury. 
The Café Cluny on Boulevard de St Germain in Paris was designated as the next meeting 
place, and the details of covert contact were fixed. 
His room was searched on the 22nd, but nothing was found. The actions of the police 
must have aroused his interest, because just before his departure, in a manner characteristic of 
his provocative style, he mailed a letter addressed to "the Hungarian censors," in which he 
complained about the checking of his correspondence - this suggests that he was completely 
aware of what was taking place around him.  
On 6 October András Tömpe,31 chief of the intelligence branch, responded to Suszta's 
concluding report with criticism that preparation was inadequate, and that the essential 
question had not been addressed, namely, how suitable would Gilbert be as a "secondary 
source." In his opinion: "I see no great prospect. It would be useful to look around among his 
acquaintances and seek direct contacts." Everything points to the fact that even without a 
face-to-face meeting Tömpe assessed Gilbert's character and his future prospects better than 
the intelligence officers that had been studying Gilbert for a long time. 
Sándor Suszta saw the situation differently: "We noted before his departure that 
"Carrel"32 [Gilbert - K.U. ] has already identified with the situation. It did not bother him that 
we regularly discussed intelligence-related questions with him. Rather, we noted that he liked 
the idea, and he was willing to discuss and assist in this area. The short, silent reflections of 
earlier days came to an end, and he answered all questions without hesitation. (...) Based on 
some topical questions we received from the appropriate department, I had him describe in 
detail his service with the English intelligence organization MI6. "Pártos" readily answered, 
moreover, he drew paper sketches of the intelligence unit's location and functioning 
principles."33 
                                           
30 ÁBTL Vol. K-184/II. Recommendation in the "Pártos" case, 21 September 1961., p. 158. 
31 András Tömpe (1913–1971) became a member of the KMP in 1933. Between 1937 and 1939 he fought in 
Spain and was seriously wounded on two occasions. In the summer of 1942 he went underground to avoid 
arrest. He received partisan training in Moscow, and in 1946 he was assigned to "diplomatic" duties and 
became the director of the KGB's South American intelligence activities. He returned to Hungary in 1958. In 
January 1962 he requested to be relieved as chief of intelligence. In 1971 he committed suicide. 
32  Sometime during the development process Gilbert's cover name was changed again, but there is no indication 
in the documents of when that happened.  
33ÁBTL Vol. K-184/ III., p. 119. 
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Gilbert provided the following names as his acquaintances: Lord Chandon, capitalist and 
son of the Viceroy of India, Mr. O'Neil, England's ambassador in Helsinki, Joseph Robinson, 
Foreign Office diplomat, Phillip Hanson, Treasury Intelligence Branch employee. Miss 
Kaldor, Treasury employee, Mr. Lourdes, Oxford economist, Mr. Deakin, professor and 
director at St Anthony College, Dedier, a former Yugoslav politician, Mr. Miller, a diplomat 
of the State Department, Nicholson, former diplomat of the Foreign Office. 
On 15 November the evaluation report of his intercepted correspondence was ready. 
Altogether, he mailed 36 postcards and 12 letters (40 percent of these were not intercepted), 
and received 9 letters. The analysis of correspondence was not positive: "his expressed 
opinions are not always honest. His statement that he is a Communist is not true."34 We can 
see here, again, that individuals who were observing Gilbert from a certain distance formed a 
more accurate picture of him than Péter Szikla, who was deeply involved in his recruitment. 
 
The "prospective agent" (?) 
So Gilbert was employed as a "social contact," and - aside from the planned meeting in 
France - the Service maintained regular contact with him in London. On 26 October 1961 - 
one month after his return home - Nagy was already meeting him in London. According to his 
evaluation, Gilbert's attitude had not changed; on the contrary, he seemed to be even more of 
a leftist than earlier. He complained that he did not have 60 pounds to subscribe to the 
Monitor magazine. - it could be assumed that he was again trying to bum some money. On 24 
November 1961 an intelligence officer called Szántó (I had no success in establishing his 
exact name and position) evaluated the results of the recruitment. He criticized Nagy's 
preparatory work, but in the end he assessed the case as successful: "from the instruction he 
received and from the tasks Carrel knows that he is requested to carry out intelligence-
related [emphasis mine - K. U.] tasks. (...) he agreed without reservations, and made several 
promises to carry out the tasks he had accepted."35 This evaluation suggests that Szántó 
intended to exploit Gilbert in effect as an expanded "social contact," with no formal 
restrictions. 
According to the 6 January 1962 report, Gilbert did not appear at the agreed Paris meeting 
place. The Ministry of Interior was feverishly working on how to organize the next meeting at 
a third location, and how to check whether Gilbert had been to Paris at all. A recommendation 
                                           
34 ÁBTL K-184/III., pp. 148-150. Evaluation Report 15 November 1961. 
35 ÁBTL K-184/III, p. 167. To Comrade Szirtes, London, 24 November 1961.  
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was made to invite him to Czechoslovakia between 22-23 April, where Péter Szikla could also 
be present. Meanwhile, the London "residentura" maintained continuous contact with him. On 
9 February the Ministry of Interior finally decided on another invitation to Paris, which they 
intended to get to him by covert means, through a letter franked and mailed in France. 
However, it was discovered that Gilbert had indicated on a postcard that he could not go to 
the meeting in Paris. 
On 17 May 1962. the Ministry of Interior had to close the case after Sergeant Béla 
Lapusnyik rode his motorcycle through the border control installations at Hegyeshalom on 9 
May and requested political asylum in Austria. Lapusnyik had been assigned to Department 
II/9 (background checks, surveillance), and had been part of the team following Gilbert during 
the latter's visit. According to some reports he had also taken a lot of classified material with 
him. Lapusnyik knew that Gilbert had been under study, and knew that "Barabás" and Szikla 
were employees of the Ministry of Interior. Lapusnyik, who was under detention by the 
Austrian Police, was poisoned on 2 June. This also brings up the responsibility of the Austrian 
authorities. Although he had earlier requested to be taken to the United States embassy 
(indeed, his departure for the USA was only a question of days), and in his death throes he 
requested an interpreter, this was not done, and he expired after a lot of suffering on 4 June. 
State Security could not know what information he had provided, and they could only hope 
that the "Carrel-case," which had only been marginal for him, was not discussed. Therefore, a 
recommendation was made to put "Carrel" to rest for a year or two - which, however, did not 
mean a suspension of contacts with the residentura. 
On 7 January 1964 the possibility of reestablishing contact was again brought up in 
London. The resident, Szalai (Captain László Németh), made the recommendation. Actually, 
Gilbert had visited Hungary again in the summer of 1963, but State Security did not make 
contact with him, and, interestingly, Gilbert did not find it necessary to look up his 
"benefactors," who had spent several months' salary on his earlier vacation. On 15 April 1964 
"Péter Szegedi,"36 a reporter stationed in London, submitted a report on Gilbert, who had 
behaved in a very suggestive manner - so suggestive, in fact, that "Szegedi" suspected a 
provocation by English counterintelligence. Based on this, on 29 May 1964 the central office 
prepared the line of approach "Szegedi" was to follow. Major Gábor Pados,37 subsection 
chief, recommended that Gilbert be asked to write on specific subjects, since his book "The 
                                           
36 His real identity could not be established. 
37 In 1964-1965 Gábor Pados (1929- ) was chief of III/I-1-B (England) subsection, then resident in Ottawa, and 
between 1977-1989 deputy department chief.  
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Appeasers" had proven to be politically very useful.38 The case was closed for good by a 
report dated 17 November 1964, according to which Major László Szabó, assigned to 
subsection III/I-1-B, had had access to the Gilbert file on 3 June 1964, and subsequently 
defected. "Carrel's" career did not survive being compromised a second time - unlike 
Gilbert's, who became a confidante of Randolph Churchill, the son of the former prime 
minister. They had met at Merton College, and soon became co-authors of a book on the 
prime minister. This opened the doors for him in the highest circles. 
Evaluation 
 
After all these some questions arise. What could Gilbert have known subjectively? What 
was State Security's evaluation of him? How should we evaluate his involvement?  
According to the documents Gilbert must have clearly realized that he was being groomed 
for intelligence work. Given his outstanding intellectual capacities, it would have been more 
than odd if he had not realized by the third day of his visit to Hungary at the latest who his 
hosts were. 
From the very beginning British counterintelligence "dangled" its own men to the 
Hungarian intelligence officers, in order to learn the methods of the residentura and deceive 
Hungarian intelligence.39 These operations became commonplace after 1956, and the 
Hungarians experienced painful failures.40 
Reading the documents from today's perspective it is difficult not to believe that Gilbert 
played the lead role in a "dangle" operation from the very first day - otherwise he would have 
shown some minimal moral resistance when the Hungarian intelligence officers gave him 
intelligence tasks. However, the Hungarian Ministry of Interior did not discover the slightest 
trace of inhibition in his behavior. The fact that Gilbert did not disappear completely 
reinforces this suspicion: he maintained contact with the Hungarian embassy; had he been 
frustrated by his experience in Budapest he would have avoided all embassy personnel.   
The theoretical foundations for his recruitment seemed sound: (at the time) he seemed to 
despise his country's political system. Gilbert was already earning a good income, and from 
the early 1960's he was making giant strides up the social ladder of British high society. His 
                                           
38 ÁBTL K-184/IV., p. 194. 
39 Blau Izidorné “Malvin”, Hans Hellin “Howard”, Szentkuti György “Demeter” ÁBTL O-8-003/I, 352- 
“Dankó” - Reasons for expulsion. Report, Budapest, 1953. május 28. 
40 ÁBTL O-8-41/65, Vol. I. "Report on the work of the London residentura in 1958." 8 November, 1958, pp. 13., 
59. and O-8-41/65, p. 236. without date or author, "Report on the work of the London residentura between 1 
June 1963 and 31 May 1964."  
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life's work is huge: he wrote 24 monographs and a monumental, 8-volume biography of 
Winston Churchill, and became a definitive authority. 
The world-savior plans he communicated to State Security and his lack of practical 
helpfulness are remarkable. The fact that he undertook the role of the most famous British 
prime minister's biographer may suggest that he had re-evaluated his life's priorities. Based on 
the facts mentioned above, it seems more probable that he was playing a role form the very 
beginning. This is also suggested by his omission of all information referring to the story 
related above from texts intended for the public. There are a number of suspicious elements in 
his visit to Hungary as well: he visited the British Embassy in Budapest on several occasions, 
saying that he had letters addressed to him there, but he failed to disclose one of his visits to 
his contact, and deliberately lost the surveillance team. He mailed a large number of serial-
numbers letters to various addresses in England, and affixed sarcastic English remarks to 
some of the envelopes "in the name of censorship" or to the censors.41 This, to say the least, is 
an unusual gesture from a person who declared to his Hungarian hosts that England was a 
police state and he considered socialism a higher developed system of governance. It is a sad 
comment on Hungarian censorship that they failed to intercept 40 percent of his outgoing 
mail.42 Gilbert's credibility is also weakened by his visit to the mother of Magda Friedmann in 
Budapest - which he does not mention in his book on Friedmann, and he never spoke in 
public about his 1961 visit to Budapest. All of this is interesting because the foundation of his 
book "Letters" is that he learned about Magda Friedman's family background only after 1990 
... It is more than odd that important biographical facts - known to Gilbert - are absent from a 
biographical volume.   
It is possible that Gilbert himself decided to make fools of his hosts and kept silent about 
it until now due to modesty. Although it cannot be ruled out completely, it is highly unlikely 
that Gilbert did not have a principal behind him. And - given Gilbert's intellectual capacities - 
we can exclude the possibility that he was so naive as never to have realized what the game 
was all about. If he had gotten mixed up in this situation innocently, he would have shown 
some sign of surprise when his contacts began to bombard him with intelligence-related 
questions - especially since he had served in military intelligence, and must have known what 
such an approach must mean. But we can establish one thing as fact: the way he behaved with 
                                           
41  For examples see ÁBTL K-184/II, p.94., pp. 130-131., and K-184/III p. 29. 
42 ÁBTL K-184/III, p. 152. Evaluation report on Carell's letters, dated 15 November 1961. Sándor Suszta.  
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his hosts in Hungary attests to considerable self-control and courage. We shall never know the 
truth without access to the secret documents of MI5 and MI6. 
In the eyes of Hungarian State Security Gilbert returned home as a recruited agent. Due to 
his behavior this evaluation soon had to be modified. Strangely enough, state security did not 
devote a great many resources to seeking his reasons for distancing himself. The disasters that 
had struck the intelligence organization (the Lapusnyik and Szabó affairs), as well as the 
incompetence of the personnel involved must have played a role in this. As I mentioned 
earlier, Gilbert's suspicious behavior had been noted by "Péter Szegedi,"  but the center paid 
no attention to it. 
Finally, there is no answer to the question of what English counterintelligence made of the 
Hungarian state security’s efforts to recruit Gilbert. He indicated to state security that he was 
probably considered “politically unreliable” in his own country – this, however, is 
contradicted by the fact that as a historian he made the fastest and best career possible in 
Great Britain. It would be rather unrealistic to suppose that he kept from British 
counterintelligence the Hungarians’ attempts to recruit him. And the fact that in the course of 
his recruitment the Hungarian state security officers did not perceive any surprise or shock 
suggests premeditated behavior on Gilbert’s part. Therefore the version that remains is that 
Gilbert was an MI5 or MI6 agent from the very beginning, and contacted the Hungarian secret 
service as part of a double play. This is supported by his meteoric career following his 
adventure in Budapest. From the British perspective such a plant would have been useful to 
study the personnel, methods and meeting points of Hungarian intelligence. However, if 
Gilbert was a British agent, then we may conclude that his far-left views were most likely an 
act that he put on in order to create a plausible legend for his recruitment. Earlier Soviet 
intelligence recruited its best sources at the Oxford and Cambridge universities. After their 
exposure brought about worldwide scandals, it is highly likely that British counterintelligence 
kept a close watch on these circles. It is also quite likely that they deliberately offered up 
likely "prospects" to enemy intelligence for purposes of deception, or in order to initiate a 
double agent operation.  If this was not the case, it would be interesting to know how Gilbert 
reconciled within himself his offer to cooperate with Hungarian Communist intelligence at a 
time when hanging was still practiced in Hungary.43 In his autobiography and during his 
public appearances he has never spoken of this. The person who has written so much about 
                                           
43 Imre Nagy and his associates were executed in 1958. The last victims of the 1956 revolution were 
hanged in 1962. Over 300 people were executed as a result of the revolution.  
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the importance of discovering and confronting the past has been silent up to now about his 
own travel to Hungary.  
